BEIJING BENDS—JUST A LITTLE—AND BRINGS A HINT OF HOPE TO HONG KONG POLITICS

By Robert Keatley
July, 2010

As the usual summer doldrums arrived in Hong Kong—the time of heat, humidity and holiday absences—its residents could also ponder something quite unexpected: a political concession from Beijing raising the possibility that the long-sought goal of full local democracy might become reality within a decade, and not remain a shimmering mirage on a distant horizon always beyond reach.

There are no guarantees, of course. The concession was relatively minor when compared to the initial demands; it helped give China the immediate political victory it sought in Hong Kong and, as a result, the central government may now refuse to travel further down the road toward completely free and fair voting—the declared "ultimate" goal of all parties concerned. The fact that the resulting agreement sharply divided Hong Kong's pro-democracy camp, at least temporarily, may make such stonewalling possible. Perhaps splitting the opposition was Beijing's true ambition and its brief experiment with compromise may well have come and gone.

Yet there are reasons for more optimism. For the first time since China regained sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997, its officials have held direct negotiations with pro-democracy leaders about reforming the political system. The precedent is crucial because for years mainland authorities had refused to deal with Hong Kong democrats who, among other things, insist on holding annual candlelight vigils to commemorate the 1989 killings at Tiananmen.  But to win legislative approval of new electoral rules they wanted in place for balloting scheduled in 2012, these officials made a concession they had previously called impossible, one that notably increases the democratic quotient of Hong Kong's peculiar political system. Further, they have said they're willing to hold future talks about how to proceed from here.

Some background is in order.

Back in December, 2007, the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress issued a major decision about political evolution in Hong Kong. Responding to insistent demands from local pro-democracy forces that Beijing honor its oft-repeated promise to introduce universal suffrage for all elected offices in Hong Kong, the Standing Committee promised little but implied a great deal. First, it flatly rejected democratic calls for free elections in 2012, the next time such voting will occur. But it did say the 2017 election of a new Chief Executive of the Hong Kong government could be chosen by popular ballot rather than, as at present, by an appointed committee of establishment figures who reliably vote as China wishes.

No More Small Circles

It also said the 2020 election of all Legislative Council (Legco) members could be by universal suffrage. At present, only half of the members are chosen by the 3.5 million voters in the general public, with the other half selected by relatively small business and professional groups that, like the election committee, mainly follow the mainland lead if only to protect their own commercial interests. The former represent five geographical constituencies; the latter come from what are derisively known as "small-circle" elections held in what are called functional constituencies, which allow some 230,000 members of special interest groups to pick half the legislature. Abolishing these narrowly-based elections has been a key democratic demand for years, and the Standing Committee dangled the possibility that it could happen in 2020.

But first, it said, Hong Kong should revise its voting system for 2012 in ways that would broaden the electoral base—but not too much. Over the past year, Chief Executive Donald Tsang Yam-kuen and his administration have been trying to do just that. Back in 2005 they had tabled an election reform plan that failed; pro-democracy members of Legco called it wholly inadequate and denied it the two-thirds approval vote needed to become law. This time around, Mr. Tsang—after an elaborate public consultation process that some considered a charade—unveiled basically the same package, with minor modifications. And once again the pro-democrats rejected it as falling far short of what was needed to propel Hong Kong toward the universal suffrage goal.

(Basically, the plan would increase the election committee that picks the chief executive to 1,200 members from 800 and increase Legco to 70 members from 60, with half the new total—35 seats—continuing to be chosen by general ballot and the other half by functional constituencies. One small gesture toward a greater public role would have the five new members from special interest groups represent a new "functional constituency" consisting of the 405 elected members of District Councils, local government bodies that monitor neighborhood issues.)

The somewhat-disunited democratic side had three broader demands. Its relatively radical members insisted that full democracy be introduced in 2012, even though both Beijing and Hong Kong governments had flatly ruled it out and more moderate democrats seemed willing to wait till 2017 and 2020. But these moderates had two demands of their own: that Beijing pledge firmly that universal suffrage would apply in those years, and that the hated functional constituencies be abolished by 2020. However, Chief Executive Tsang said he was not empowered to write any rules for voting beyond 2012, when his own term in office expires, and Beijing likewise refused to consider those changes.

Fear of Failure

The result was impasse, and that's where things stood as the scheduled June 23 Legco vote on the government package drew near. It seemed certain that another government reform bill would fail because the democrats once again could muster the 21 legislative votes needed for a blocking minority. But this time the consequences of failure appeared much more serious: the Tsang administration, which has no public mandate, would suffer a great loss of credibility; civil unrest might force Mr. Tsang, like his predecessor, to resign his office in mid-term; China, increasingly fed up with the democratic opposition it so distrusts, could abandon even lukewarm support for real election reform; and governance issues might damage the economy. Across Hong Kong society, there were growing worries about future political and economic stability if Legco blocked the plan. And failure would also reflect badly upon mainland authorities, suggesting they didn't really understand how to deal with the special place that is Hong Kong.

The impasse continued through mid-May when by-elections in five geographical constituencies were held. These were prompted by the more confrontational wing of the democratic bloc, who hoped to turn them into a de facto referendum on universal suffrage that would shame Beijing into major concessions. The effort failed in its primary goal, though it had other merit. [For discussion, see Professor Ma Ngoc's article in this issue of the Hong Kong Journal.] But once that vote—vehemently denounced by Beijing—was out of the way, signs of political compromise suddenly appeared.

Several well-known pro-democracy figures, who had opposed the by-election tactic, said they were ready to meet mainland officials to discuss ways of making the government's reform package more palatable. To great public surprise, senior members of the central government's official Liaison Office in Hong Kong responded that they were ready to do so. The resulting talks marked the first time Beijing officials ever held formal talks with democrats, often criticized for being short on "patriotism" and "agents" of foreign interests. By local standards, it was a stunning breakthrough, especially as it bypassed the Tsang administration which was supposed to be the only authorized channel for such negotiations.

The outcome was less stunning, but significant even so. The democrats did not win firm commitments about universal suffrage for 2017 and 2020 elections. Neither did they get a promise that functional constituencies will be abolished within the decade. But they did get a concession that gives the general public additional voting power—a concession that Beijing earlier had called impossible . In 2012, as under the original government plan, five of the ten new Legco members will represent a newly-created functional constituency consisting of elected District Council members, with only council members eligible to become candidates. But those who pick the winners will not just be other council members; instead, all 3.2 million voters who do not belong to some other functional constituency will do the choosing in a city-wide ballot.

Two Votes for All

This will give everyone two votes—one in a geographical district and one in a functional constituency, with most falling into the new District Council constituency. As a result, 40 members of the new 70-seat Legco must win a public mandate rather than simply be chosen by colleagues in smaller interest groups, such as finance, real estate or the law. This hardly upsets the current electoral system—still tilted toward the establishment—but it does set an important precedent by pointing toward a greater democratic quotient in elections to come. Neither does it guarantee that pro-democrats will form a legislative majority; as always, many seats will be won by pro-government parties that excel at basic grass roots politicking. But it does give democrats an opportunity to swell their Legco ranks, provided they run effective campaigns and stop squabbling among themselves.

The Hong Kong government quickly wrote the compromise into its own plan and sent it to Legco in the form of two resolutions; they passed easily by 46-12 and 46-13 margins, six more votes than needed. Chief Executive Tsang said it was "a triumph of reason" and the U.S. Consulate called it a "significant step forward in Hong Kong's democratic development ". Across the city, a more common reaction was great relief; a long quarrel had ended for the time being and the more dire possibilities had been postponed. Although the basic political disputes were not settled, an extended period of relative calm seemed likely.

For one thing, Mr. Tsang should now complete his term on schedule and hand over the reform issue to his successor as he has always hoped. Many details about implementing the just-passed 2012 election package need to be worked out, but none should raise fundamental problems. Beyond that, there are no fractious political deadlines in view before election day in two years time. Political parties will devote much of their energy to finding and fielding candidates in hopes of increasing their influence. As always, the leading pro-government party, the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) should fare well in the next vote. It has mastered basic level politics and works hard to help resolve local problems that matter to ordinary voters. In addition, its pro-democratic rivals seldom can match DAB organization or resources, allegedly channeled generously from the mainland for food, drink and other attractions at party rallies. DAB victories will probably keep the pro-democrats from winning a parliamentary majority in the to-be-expanded Legco.

In fact, the democrats may not do well unless they can restore some unity to their ranks. They're now split between those willing to settle for modest but immediate gains before pushing hard for bigger future ones, and those who demand, for reasons of principle, major gains immediately even when confrontation guarantees they'll achieve nothing. The former includes most, but not all, leaders of the Democratic Party and others whose zeal is tempered by practicality. The latter includes Civic Party leader Audrey Eu Yuet-mee who claims the compromise makes achieving universal suffrage even more difficult, and League of Social Democrats legislator "Long Hair" Leung Kwok-hung who called the final Legco vote a "shameless" betrayal. The democratic divide is so intense that there were fears radicals would physically attack moderates at the annual July1 public demonstration on behalf of democratic reform. (It didn't happen.)

 It's not possible to predict what comes next, but—as there is no pressing issue that demands immediate resolution—all parties have time to relax and regroup before returning to the political wars. One key to the future is whether or not mainland officials honor their pledge to hold future talks about more sweeping electoral changes to take effect after 2012. There was speculation that the "two votes for everyone" approach might make it possible to abolish all functional constituencies in their current form.

Meantime, the economic scene offered its own confusion. On one hand, recovery continued, with government claiming 2010's growth rate may well exceed the official 5% forecast. Exports rose sharply, and so did tourist and business arrivals. Real estate prices sagged a bit at the top, easing fears of a bubble, though mass market rates stayed high. Most economic indicators showed welcome increases from last year, and the official mood remained cautiously optimistic.

Yet there were some disquieting notes. Unemployment rose slightly for the first time in many months, and new numbers showed the wealth gap had grown wider—with some 11% of the population living below the poverty line. Beyond that, the Hong Kong stock market, like others around the world, fell sharply in June's final weeks, and anxiety spread. There were renewed worries about the strength of the Chinese economy, American market demand and overall global growth. Pessimists revived talk of a double-dip recession. Though nothing major had gone seriously wrong, the economic mood at mid-year was decidedly nervous.

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Robert Keatley is editor of the Hong Kong Journal.

07/01/2010